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In this paper we address the issues of using edge detection techniques on facial images to produce cancellable
biometric templates and a novel method for template verification against tampering. With increasing use of
biometrics, there is a real threat for the conventional systems using face databases, which store images of users
in raw and unaltered form. If compromised not only it is irrevocable, but can be misused for cross-matching
across different databases. So it is desirable to generate and store revocable templates for the same user in
different applications to prevent cross-matching and to enhance security, while maintaining privacy and ethics.
By comparing different edge detection methods it has been observed that the edge detection based on the Roberts
Cross operator performs consistently well across multiple face datasets, in which the face images have been taken
under a variety of conditions. And we have proposed a novel scheme using hashing, for extra verification, in order
to harden the security of the stored biometric templates.
Keywords : Cancellable Biometrics, Edge Detection, Face Biometrics, Template Security.
1. INTRODUCTION
The dimensions, proportions and physical at-
tributes of a person’s face are unique. Biomet-
ric facial recognition systems will measure and
analyze the overall structure, shape and propor-
tions of the face: Distance between the eyes, nose,
mouth, and jaw edges; upper outlines of the eye
sockets, the sides of the mouth, the location of the
nose and eyes, the area surrounding the cheek-
bones. At enrolment, several pictures are taken
of the user’s face, with slightly different angles
and facial expressions, to allow for more accurate
matching. For verification and identification, the
user stands in front of the camera for a few sec-
onds, and the scan is compared with the template
previously recorded. Benefits of face biometric
systems being that it is not intrusive, can be
done from a distance, even without the user being
aware of it (for instance when scanning the en-
trance to a bank or a high security area). Weak-
nesses of face biometric systems: Face biometric
systems are more suited for authentication than
for identification purposes, as it is easy to change
the proportion of one’s face by wearing a mask,
a nose extension, etc. Also, user perceptions /
civil liberty: Most people are uncomfortable with
having their picture taken. Applications of face
biometrics include access to restricted areas and
buildings, banks, embassies, military sites, air-
ports, law enforcement.
One advantage of passwords over biometrics is
that they can be re-issued. If a token or a pass-
word is lost or stolen, it can be cancelled and
replaced by a newer version. This is not natu-
rally available in biometrics. If someone’s face is
compromised from a database, they cannot can-
cel or reissue it. Cancellable biometrics is a way
in which to incorporate protection and the re-
placement features into biometrics. It was first
proposed by N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell and R.
M. Bolle [1].
Several methods for generating cancellable bio-
metrics have been proposed. The first fingerprint
based cancellable biometric system was designed
and developed by S. Tulyakov, F. Farooq and V.
Govindaraju [2]. Essentially, cancellable biomet-
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rics performs a distortion of the biometric image
or features before matching. The variability in
the distortion parameters provides the cancellable
nature of the scheme. Some of the proposed tech-
niques operate using their own recognition en-
gines, such as A. B. J. Teoh, A. Goh and D. C. L.
Ngo [3] and M. Savvides, B. V. K. V. Kumar and
P. K. Khosla [4]. Whereas other methods, such as
M. A. Dabbah, W. L. Woo and S. S. Dlay [5] take
the advantage of the advancement of the well-
established biometric research for their recogni-
tion front-end to conduct recognition. Although
this increases the restrictions on the protection
system, it makes the cancellable templates more
accessible for available biometric technologies.
1.1. Edge Detection
The result of applying an edge detector to an
image may lead to a set of connected curves that
indicate the boundaries of objects, the bound-
aries of surface markings as well as curves that
correspond to discontinuities in surface orienta-
tion. Thus, applying an edge detection algo-
rithm to an image may significantly reduce the
amount of data to be processed and may there-
fore filter out information that may be regarded
as less relevant, while preserving the important
structural properties of an image. The edge de-
tection filters used for experimentation are based
on Discrete Laplace operator, Sobel operator [6],
Roberts Cross operator [7], Frei-Chen operator [8]
and Prewitt operator [9].
1.2. Cryptosystems in Biometrics
Biometric cryptosystems as discussed by Y.
Dodis, R. Ostrovsky, L. Reyzin and A. Smith
[10], F. Hao, R. Anderson and J. Daugman [11],
K. Nandakumar, A.K. Jain and S. Pankanti [12],
Y. Sutcu, Q. Li and N. Memon [13], use tech-
niques that associate an external key with a user’s
biometric to obtain helper data. The helper
data should not reveal any significant informa-
tion about the template or the key and at the
same time it can be used to recover the key when
the original biometric is presented. The con-
cept of data hiding in digital watermarks has
been discussed by C. T. Hsu and J. L. Wu
[14]. Encryption algorithm to secure the im-
age using fingerprint and password has been dis-
cussed by Manvjeet Kaur, Dr. Sanjeev Sofat and
Deepak Saraswat [15] involves more time consum-
ing methods.
1.3. Secure Hash Algorithm
A hash function is an algorithm that transforms
(hashes) an arbitrary set of data elements, such
as a text file, into a single fixed length value (the
hash). The computed hash value may then be
used to verify the integrity of copies of the orig-
inal data without providing any means to derive
said original data. This irreversibility means that
a hash value may be freely distributed or stored,
as it is used for comparative purposes only. SHA
stands for Secure Hash Algorithm. SHA-2 in-
cludes a significant number of changes from its
predecessor, SHA-1. SHA-2 consists of a set of
four hash functions with digests that are 224, 256,
384 or 512 bits. We have used SHA-256 for our
experimentation.
The security provided by a hashing algorithm is
entirely dependent upon its ability to produce a
unique value for any specific set of data. When
a hash function produces the same hash value for
two different sets of data then a collision is said to
occur. Collision raises the possibility that an at-
tacker may be able to computationally craft sets
of data which provide access to information se-
cured by the hashed values of pass codes or to
alter computer data files in a fashion that would
not change the resulting hash value and would
thereby escape detection. A strong hash function
is one that is resistant to such computational at-
tacks. A weak hash function is one where a com-
putational approach to producing collisions is be-
lieved to be possible. A broken hash function is
one where a computational method for producing
collisions is known to exist. In 2005, security flaws
were identified in SHA-1, namely that a mathe-
matical weakness might exist, indicating that a
stronger hash function would be desirable. Al-
though SHA-2 bears some similarity to the SHA-
1 algorithm, these attacks have not been success-
fully extended to SHA-2.
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1.4. Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is
a specification for the encryption of electronic
data established by the U.S. National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001 [20].
The algorithm described by AES is a symmetric-
key algorithm, meaning the same key is used
for both encrypting and decrypting the data.
AES is based on a design principle known as a
substitution-permutation network, and is fast in
both software and hardware. We have used AES
to generate key size of 256 bits (AES-256). High
speed and low RAM requirements were criteria of
the AES selection process. Thus AES performs
well on a wide variety of hardware, from 8-bit
smart cards to high-performance computers.
2. PROPOSED METHOD
2.1. Enrolment (shown in Figure 1)
Step 1: Input face image from dataset (ATT,
YALE or IFD) which is in greyscale (or con-
verted). The ATT dataset of faces (formerly ’The
ORL Database of Faces’), YALE dataset and IFD
(Indian Face Dataset) are unmodified except for
conversion to JPEG and renaming of the files.
Datasets used are ATT, IFD and YALE with
sample images shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and
Figure 5 respectively.
Step 2: Apply edge detection filter. The
edge detection filters used for experimentation are
based on Discrete Laplace operator, Sobel opera-
tor, Roberts Cross operator, Frei-Chen operator
and Prewitt operator.
Step 3: Invert colors of the image and then auto
normalize. This is done because a major draw-
back to application of the edge detection filters
is an inherent reduction in overall image contrast
produced by the operation, which is in turn used
to become an advantage in our case since it pro-
vides obscuring the original image to an accept-
able level. Normalize stretches the histogram, so
the whole range of colors is used as to get more
information out of the image. Hence by inverting
the filtered image and auto normalizing we get
the contrast to an acceptable level.
Step 4: Calculate SHA-256 hash value of the
final cancellable face image and encrypt it with
AES-256 bit cipher. The AES-256 bit cipher is
a symmetric key algorithm which uses the same
password for encrypting and decrypting.
Step 5: Obtain the final filtered face image
and store in the corresponding dataset. Dataset
ATT-L is the set obtained after applying step 2
with Laplace edge detector filter and step 3 on
ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 6. Dataset
ATT-S is the set obtained after applying step
2 with Sobel edge detector filter and step 3 on
ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 7). Dataset
ATT-R is the set obtained after applying step 2
with Roberts edge detector filter and step 3 on
ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 8). Dataset
ATT-F is the set obtained after applying step 2
with Frei-Chen edge detector filter and step 3 on
ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 9). Dataset
ATT-P is the set obtained after applying step 2
with Prewitt edge detector filter and step 3 on
ATT dataset (sample shown in Figure 10).Simi-
larly for YALE and IFD datasets.
2.2. Verification (shown in Figure 2)
Steps 1 to 3: Same as in Enrolment.
Step 4: Apply face recognition methods to
identify the person set. In our experiment the
face recognition methods use the following: PCA
(Principal Component Analysis), IPCA (Incre-
mental PCA), LDA (Linear Discriminant Analy-
sis) and ICA (Independent Component Analysis).
Step 5: For the set of images of the matched
person, verify the SHA-256 hash values after de-
crypting with AES-256 cipher. This step ensures
that the stored biometric templates have not been
tampered with.
The proposed method starts with a non-
invertible feature transformation by using edge
detection filters and is combined with a key bind-
ing biometric crypto system. The SHA-256 hash
value, which is AES-256 bit encrypted, helps
in binding the cancellable template with an en-
crypted key. The AES-256 bit cipher is a sym-
metric algorithm and hence uses the same pass-
word for encryption and decryption. Here the
password that is used to bind the values can be
user driven or be at the system level, depending
on the feasibility of the biometric system.
Our proposed method focuses on the Roberts’
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Figure 1. Block diagram of proposed method for enrolment.
Figure 2. Block diagram of proposed method for verification.
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Cross based edge detector due to its consis-
tently highest matching accuracy across different
datasets [Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3]. Accord-
ing to Roberts, an edge detector should have the
following properties: the produced edges should
be well-defined, the background should contribute
as little noise as possible, and the intensity of
edges should correspond as close as possible to
what a human would perceive.
After applying the edge filter(s), the image col-
ors are inverted since edge filters discard other
information than the detected edges (first image
of Figure 11). The image is then auto normal-
ized edges (second image of Figure 11) to the full
dynamic range, to further enhance the remain-
ing details. In image processing, normalization
is a process that changes the range of pixel in-
tensity values. Applications include photographs
with poor contrast due to glare, for example. Nor-
malization is sometimes called contrast stretch-
ing. In more general fields of data processing,
such as digital signal processing, it is referred to
as dynamic range expansion. The purpose of dy-
namic range expansion in the various applications
is usually to bring the image, or other type of sig-
nal, into a range that is more familiar or normal
to the senses, hence the term normalization. Of-
ten, the motivation is to achieve consistency in
dynamic range for a set of data, signals, or im-
ages to avoid mental distraction or fatigue. For
example, a newspaper will strive to make all of
the images in an issue share a similar range of
greyscale.
Normalization is a linear process. If the inten-
sity range of the image is 50 to 180 and the desired
range is 0 to 255 the process entails subtracting 50
from each of pixel intensity, making the range 0
to 130. Then for each pixel the intensity is mul-
tiplied by 255/130, making the range 0 to 255.
Auto-normalization in image processing software
typically normalizes to the full dynamic range of
the number system specified in the image file for-
mat. We have found through our experiment that
when the face images are auto normalized after
applying edge filter and inverting colors, match-
ing accuracy increases.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The ATT dataset [17] comprises of face frontal
images with low resolution (92x112 pixels). The
images have dark background (Figure 3) with
most of it not present in the images by compari-
son to other datasets. From Table 1, LDA based
face recognition method is having the best match-
ing accuracy. The proposed method with Roberts
Cross filter and Sobel filter are showing the least
variation (1.3%) w.r.t. matching accuracy.
The YALE dataset [18] comprises of face
frontal images with medium resolution (320x243
pixels). The face images (Figure 4) have mostly
a bright background and a few with shadows.
Those shadows are subsequently removed due to
edge detection filtering. From Table 2, LDA
based face recognition method is having the best
matching accuracy. The proposed method with
Roberts Cross filter, Frei-Chen filter and Prewitt
filter are showing the least variation (1.7%) w.r.t.
matching accuracy.
The IFD dataset [19] comprises of face frontal
and some side poses images with high resolution
(640x480 pixels). The face images (Figure 5) have
mostly a dull background. From Table 3, LDA
based face recognition method is having the best
matching accuracy. The proposed method with
Roberts Cross filter, Laplace filter and Sobel fil-
ter are showing the least variation (1.3%) w.r.t.
matching accuracy.
The facial images across all the datasets used
here are taken under controlled conditions and
are less susceptible to noise. After applying the
edge filter and inverting colors, we have further
enhanced the image by auto normalization. The
face recognition method which uses LDA com-
bined with Roberts Cross filter in our proposed
scheme shows the highest matching accuracy con-
sistently across the wide range of facial images of
different types of datasets used. There is insignif-
icant changes w.r.t. matching accuracy (varying
from 1.3% to 1.7%) across the datasets, with and
without our proposed method.
Template security emphasizes on obscuring the
template images, the slight reduction in accuracy
is definitely acceptable. Robert’s filter is math-
ematically the simplest of all the compared edge
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Figure 3. From ATT dataset.
Figure 4. From Yale dataset.
Figure 5. From IFD dataset.
Figure 6. From ATT-L.
Figure 7. From ATT-S.
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Figure 8. From ATT-R.
Figure 9. From ATT-F.
Figure 10. From ATT-P.
Figure 11. Before and after auto normal-
ization.
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Table 1
Facial recognition accuracy of ATT dataset and variants
Accuracy (%) (Recognition Rate)
Classifier
Dataset
ATT ATT-L ATT-S ATT-R ATT-F ATT-P
ICA 91.3 83.1 86.9 86.9 87.5 88.8
IPCA 93.1 87.5 89.4 88.1 88.1 90.0
LDA 94.4 91.3 93.1 93.1 92.5 91.9
PDA 91.3 83.1 88.1 87.5 88.8 88.1
Table 2
Recognition accuracy of face recognition methods of YALE dataset and variants
Accuracy (%) (Recognition Rate)
Classifier
Dataset
YALE YALE-L YALE-S YALE-R YALE-F YALE-P
ICA 83.3 85.0 81.7 78.3 86.7 81.7
IPCA 71.7 68.3 75.0 73.3 78.3 75.0
LDA 91.7 86.7 88.3 90.0 90.0 90.0
PCA 81.7 86.7 83.3 80.0 85.0 86.7
Table 3
Recognition accuracy of face recognition methods of IFD dataset and variants
Accuracy (%) (Recognition Rate)
Classifier
Dataset
IFD IFD-L IFD-S IFD-R IFD-F IFD-P
ICA 76.7 76.3 75.4 78.0 75.0 75.0
IPCA 76.7 86.0 86.9 86.0 86.0 86.4
LDA 91.1 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.4 89.0
PCA 76.3 72.0 76.3 75.8 76.7 77.1
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detection methods. Hence, the proposed scheme
has low impact on the speed of execution, hence
can be incorporated into existing systems with-
out too much overhead. The proposed scheme
can be incorporated at the time of enrolment and
verification itself. The filtered images can thus
be stored instead of the unaltered face images,
thereby providing a form of encryption. Since the
subsequent images taken for enrolment are binary
different even when it is with same camera and
lighting conditions, the obscured template will be
different. This in turn provides a non-invertible
template, where in case the dataset of the filtered
images (used for matching) is compromised, it can
be revoked a new set generated without worrying
about misuse of the lost data. Also, by varying
the convolution kernel values of the Robert’s filter
gradient, more cancellable templates can be gen-
erated for a particular face image, as discussed for
difference of gaussian edge filter by G. Hemantha
Kumar and Manoj Krishnaswamy [16].
By storing SHA-256 hash of the stored bio-
metric template and encrypting with AES-256
algorithm (Table 4) we have provided a strong
measure against biometric template tampering.
SHA-256 hashing and AES-256 cipher can be per-
formed computationally fast (less than a second)
and hence can be easily incorporated into exist-
ing systems. Although we have assumed that the
attacker will not be able to easily gain access on
the various levels to compromise the entire sys-
tem, even in case the entire system was being
compromised, the cancellable templates can be
re-issued which provides new hash values auto-
matically. Due to the non-invertible nature of the
templates there is no worry of misuse of lost data.
Other schemes involve calculating the helper data
(in our case the ciphered hash value) for each set
of biometric templates which becomes time con-
suming during verification. The time taken to de-
crypt only once enhances the speed of execution
and can be incorporated in systems which require
speed as well as security. Useful scenarios for the
proposed method could be in real time systems,
banking, ATM access, etc.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the final filtered images it-
self can be used for face matching instead of unal-
tered face images. The results are checked across
datasets which encompasses a wide variety of im-
ages taken under different conditions as well as
different resolutions and image quality. We pro-
posed a novel method for generating cancellable
face biometrics and to secure the stored templates
in a way which is suitable for integration with cur-
rent face matching systems with acceptable alter-
ations.
Also, by using fast, proven and standard hashing
(SHA-256) and cryptographic (AES-256) meth-
ods for data verification, the vault is further en-
hanced. We discussed their strengths and short-
comings, as well as their relative performance on
different databases under a variety of conditions.
The approach allows for enhanced template se-
curity, privacy and maintaining good ethics in
biometric systems. It is important that biomet-
rics based authentication systems are designed to
withstand different sources of attacks on the sys-
tem.
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